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ESSAY
On September 17, 1987, the United States celebrated the two-hun-
dredth anniversary of the signing of the Constitution. Congress created
the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution to
encourage commemoration of the Constitution. In pursuit of this goal
the Commission and the West Publishing Company sponsored a National
Bicentennial Essay Competition for Law Students. The Southwestern
Law Journal is pleased to cooperate with the Commission by reprinting
the following winning entry from within the Fifth Federal Judicial
Circuit.
OUR AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
by Daniel J. Balhoff *
"W Ehold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are createdIequal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
• • unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness."' It may seem odd that an essay about the United
States Constitution should open with words from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, but these words capture the essence of the American mission, the
fruition of which the Constitution made possible. With these words a nation
was christened more than two hundred years ago, a nation born in revolt but
conceived in liberty. When its people finally won their independence on the
battlefield, an even more formidable task faced them-how to "secure the
blessings of liberty to [themselves] and [their] posterity."'2 The story of their
struggle not only to win freedom but to defend it and hand it down to suc-
ceeding generations is the story of America.
When asked to explain why we enjoy so many personal freedoms in this
country, the understandable inclination of many is to point to the Bill of
Rights. But these provisions, while important, list only a fraction of the
total panoply of rights enjoyed by every American citizen. Furthermore,
many national constitutions have "bills of rights." Why has America suc-
ceeded in guaranteeing rights when other nations have failed? The funda-
mental reason is the structure of government set up in the United States
Constitution, a structure based upon the twin pillars of separation of powers
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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and federalism. It is this unique structure that has enabled Americans to
exercise personal freedoms to a truly unique extent.
This essay seeks to explore the structure of our government under the
Constitution-both how it was intended to work and how it has worked. It
therefore discusses provisions for separation of powers and federalism in the
Constitution, and how these provisions have guaranteed individual liberties.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS, FEDERALISM, AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Philosophical and Historical Bases
Baron de Montesquieu, a French political philosopher, is generally
credited as being the first to espouse a separation of governmental powers as
a means to guarantee freedom. In 1748 he observed that all governments,
including democracies, tended to aggrandize power to themselves. This con-
centration of power came at the expense of the liberties of the citizenry.
Montesquieu decided that the best way to avoid this problem was to divide
the powers of the sovereign:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is
no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative
and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would
then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with violence and oppression.3
Montesquieu's theory of a tripartite government with distinct legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial branches was implemented to varying degrees by the
thirteen American states after the Revolution. 4 In 1787 this theory became
the basis for the national government envisioned in the newly proposed
United States Constitution.
The original Constitution was divided into a preamble (describing the
goals of the newly formed government) and seven articles. The first three of
these articles set forth the structure of the national government: article I,
section 1, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives";5 article II, section 1, "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America"; 6 article III, section 1, "The judi-
cial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish."' 7 Thus the full power of the new government could not be exercised
without the consent of three distinct bodies: the Congress had to pass a law;
3. Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 169.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 316 (J. Madison) (Modern Library College ed.).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
6. Id. art. II, § 1.
7. Id. art. III, § 1.
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the President had to enforce it; and the judiciary had to judge the law's
applicability in any particular case.
Federalism is based upon the idea that a local government, being closer to
the problems of the citizenry, is more responsive toward those problems than
is a national government. But federalism in the United States Constitution
was not a product of pure political theory to the same extent as was separa-
tion of powers. It was, instead, a product of tradition, experiment, and
compromise.
Before the Revolution, the thirteen states were thirteen very dissimilar
colonies with relatively few ties among them. Each had its own colonial
government, which answered only to the King and Parliament. When the
colonies declared independence, they became thirteen separate nations, al-
lied only in war against the King. The first "national government" set up
was under the Articles of Confederation. This government had little real
power, the exercise of which depended on the consent of the several states.
There was no question that each state had the right to secede. Sovereignty,
then, rested solely in the states, and the national government derived its au-
thority from them.
Dissatisfaction with this loose confederation prompted national leaders to
meet in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 in an attempt to revise the Arti-
cles of Confederation so that the national government might have sufficient
powers to carry out its affairs.
Given the consensus that the national government had to be strengthened,
a key concern of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention was how to
achieve the proper balance of power between the national and state govern-
ments. Through a series of historic compromises, the federal system resulted
as the solution. Sovereignty was not to abide in either the national govern-
ment nor the states alone; sovereign powers were instead divided. This fed-
eralism was manifested in two ways: first, the national government was
limited to powers enumerated in the Constitution, whereas the states exer-
cised plenary powers; and second, state constituencies participated in the
structure of the national government. The first element, enumerated federal-
ism, has been the subject of much case law and political discussion. It is,
however, the second element, structural federalism, that continuously,
though subtly, comes into play in our constitutional system. This structural
federalism is one of the key characteristics that distinguish the American
system of government from all others.
B. How the Structure Works
Most Americans probably can name several features of our government-
the presidential veto, judicial review, impeachment-but few fully realize
how these elements fit together in a system that brings to bear the virtues of
separation of powers and federalism at every phase of the process.
In the normal constitutional scheme, all laws officially originate in Con-
gress. The President may propose the enactment of a law, but the de jure
effect of such a proposal would be no different from that of a citizen's sugges-
1987] ESSA Y 1075
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tion to his congressman. The primary force in the lawmaking scheme, then,
is in Congress.
Congress is divided into two bodies: the House of Representatives and the
Senate. These bodies represent two very different constituencies. Each
member of the House represents a population approximately equal to that
represented by each of his fellow congressmen. The House therefore has a
national constituency in that every person in the nation is equally repre-
sented. The Senate, on the contrary, is apportioned not according to popula-
tion but instead by states, each state having two senators. The Senate
therefore has a federal constituency. Before a bill can pass Congress, it must
receive the support of a majority of the populace as a whole and of the states
as reflected by their respective representatives.
If the bill passes both houses of Congress, it is sent to the President. If
ours were a system of strict separation of powers, the President, as head of
the executive branch, would have no part in the making of laws. But the
Constitution assigns him a veto power. If he signs the bill, it becomes the
law of the land. If he vetoes it, the bill is sent back to Congress, which may
override the veto by two-thirds majority of each house. The ability to over-
ride means there is a greater measure of separation of powers than if the veto
were absolute. There is less separation, however, than if there were no veto
at all. The effect of the veto, as is the effect of any breach of separation of
powers, is to unite the branches in purpose and thrust by forcing the forma-
tion of a consensus between the legislature and the executive.
The President, in considering whether or not to sign the bill into law,
brings to bear a peculiar mixture of national and state constituencies. The
President is not elected by winning a majority of the popular vote, but in-
stead by garnering a majority of the electoral vote. A state's electoral vote is
calculated by adding its number of representatives (allocated according to
national principles) to its number of senators (allocated according to federal
principles). Another federal twist is the winner-take-all aspect of each state's
electoral votes. This forces a presidential candidate to try to win as many
states as possible instead of trying to pile up large majorities in just a few
states. It is therefore possible for a candidate to place second in the popular
vote count, but nevertheless be elected President.
Thus a bill is reviewed by three constituencies-one national, one federal,
and one mixed-before it may become law. Hopefully, each institution-the
House, the Senate, and the President-will take into consideration the first
element of federalism, that is, whether the bill falls within the constitution-
ally enumerated powers of the national government. If this were the only
provision for federalism, the protection of states as viable political institu-
tions would depend solely upon the benevolence of the players in the na-
tional government. Fortunately the Constitution buttresses the enumerated
restrictions with structural federalism, which make certain that the concerns
of the states are considered throughout the process. Whereas an elected offi-
cial surely may try to remember his duty to the Constitution, he more surely
will not forget his duty to the constituents that elected him. The framers
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recognized this political nature and, instead of denouncing and trying to
overcome it, they used it as an essential element of the process. They be-
lieved in a limited government. They achieved that end by requiring that
each expansion be passed before three different and often conflicting
constituencies.
Once a bill becomes law, it is the duty of the President to enforce it. The
President's mixed constituency affects his actions in the enforcement of laws
in the same way as in the decision whether or not to veto. Thus the Electo-
ral College brings elements of federalism into the execution of the laws.
These elements would be removed if, as many have suggested, the Electoral
College were abolished and the President were elected strictly by popular
vote.
Under a system of pure separation of powers, the President would be re-
sponsible to the people alone and Congress would have no say in the execu-
tion of the laws. The Constitution, however, gives Congress a check on the
executive power through the power of impeachment of officials (including
the President) and the Senate's ability to reject appointments. These con-
gressional powers lessen the separation and have the effect of forcing the
executive branch to conform (at least somewhat) to congressional wishes.
Whenever the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property,
amendments to the Constitution guarantee "due process of law." This
phrase has been interpreted to encompass, at the very least, a right to notice
and a hearing before an independent magistrate. 8 But it is the Constitution's
structure of government and its provision for an independent judiciary that
breathe life into this right.
The Constitution requires very little in the way of a national court system.
Theoretically, all the document mandates is one Supreme Court with juris-
diction in a very few areas, none of which touch the common man. It also
allows Congress to set up lower federal courts and grant much more exten-
sive jurisdiction. The casual observer might wonder why Congress would
grant a rival branch more power. Upon further reflection, the answer be-
comes clear: Congress needs courts to implement its laws. Without federal
court jurisdiction, Congress would be at the mercy of the various state court
systems. Although Congress has little control over federal courts, it has
even less over state courts.
Why, then, has Congress not given federal courts jurisdiction equal to the
possible constitutional limits? Here again structural federalism comes into
play. The state-related constituencies of Congress can be counted upon to
oppose extensions of federal court power that diminish state control. The
end result of this jurisdictional tug-of-war is an ever-shifting balance be-
tween two viable court systems-federal and state.
The product of this constitutional structure, which combines elements of
separation of powers and federalism, has been an inefficient and generally
slow-moving government. Some advocates have come out in favor of
8. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-80 (1975).
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streamlining the system so that all its constituent elements could pull to-
gether in a common cause. But, as Chief Justice Warren Burger noted in
Bowsher v. Synar:9
That this system of division and separation of powers produces con-
flicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it was deliber-
ately so structured to assure full, vigorous and open debate on the great
issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the operation of
checks on the exercise of the governmental power.10
The very genius of the system lies in its inefficiency.
II. GUARANTEEING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
A person's freedom may be threatened by any of three sources: foreign
powers, fellow citizens, or his own government. In order to judge the Con-
stitution's success in protecting individual liberties, we must gauge its ability
to deal with each of these threats. We therefore must look to our history as
a nation and let it pass judgment for us.
A. Dealing With Foreign Powers
The Constitution vests the entire power of conduct of foreign affairs in
the national government. This represents the commonly held belief that it is
necessary that the United States speak with a single voice when dealing with
allies and foes alike. The plenary powers of states thus do not extend into
this arena. But, once again, structural federalism gives state-based constitu-
encies a role.
The most awesome foreign affairs power of the American government, as
it is with any government, is the power to declare war. The Constitution
vests this power in Congress alone. But the war power as it is understood in
our system extends far beyond actions taken in connection with declared
war. Presidents have ordered military intervention in foreign countries on
numerous occasions in times of peace, that is, in the absence of a declared
war. The Supreme Court has generally recognized such presidential actions
and related executive orders to be constitutional, deriving authority from the
President's position as Commander-in-Chief."I Such actions can serve an
important purpose in protecting American interests abroad and, in some
cases, averting full-scale war. It is notable, though, that such actions have
yielded only a varying measure of success. Conversely, of the five declared
wars in our history,' 2 four have been complete victories for the United
States. Only the War of 1812 was not, and this has been generally consid-
ered a draw.
The President and his subordinates also protect American interests by ne-
gotiating treaties with other nations. These agreements cover a wide variety
9. 106 S. Ct. 3181, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986).
10. Id. at 3187.
11. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370-77 (11 th ed. 1985).
12. The War of 1812, Mexican War, Spanish-American War, World War I, and World
War II were the declared wars.
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of subjects, from military alliances to trade policy. The Constitution re-
quires that the Senate approve any treaty before it can take effect. The ap-
proval requirement brings not only the legislature into the process, but also
the accompanying state interests. This has proved to be more than just a
nominal obstacle in the President's latitude in this area, as many treaties
have been rejected by the Senate.
On the whole, the United States has been able to conduct a successful
foreign policy. No hostile power has invaded American soil since 1815. The
nation is involved in working military and economic alliances with other
nations throughout the world. The system has been successful in keeping
the peace most of the time, but the Constitution has provided the effective
option of war when necessary. The end result is that Americans have not
only been able to maintain their own independence, but have also been able
to win freedom for millions of others throughout the world.
B. Balancing Citizens' Rights
Recognizing that the maximization of individual liberty is a worthy goal,
it must be noted that no one is truly free in a state of anarchy. Such a state
has a master as oppressive as any. The master is fear. He demands the
complete devotion of his subjects. In such a state, citizens are prisoners in
their own houses. A central goal of any virtuous government must be to
eliminate anarchy so that people can live and work together in peace. The
challenge of a system dedicated to freedom is to strike the proper balance
between government control and anarchy so that its citizens serve no king-
neither fear nor state.
Historically, states have held the primary responsibility for keeping public
order in our constitutional system. The states all have laws against such
crimes as murder, assault, and theft and employ police to enforce these laws.
State courts handle the great majority of criminal cases in this nation, and
state penitentiaries house those found guilty. State legislatures decide the
penalties for violations. And, importantly, state taxes pay for the operation
of each state's system.
Essentially, then, the fifty states represent fifty different ways of maintain-
ing public order. Each way has its faults and virtues, and each has a price
tag. The result is a virtual free market, the service being protection from
crime, and the price, taxes. Just as manufacturers compete for customers,
the states (especially in today's mobile society) must compete for citizens
and industry. Thus there is additional pressure on each state to improve the
quality of protection and lower the cost. Each state experiments to this end
with new ideas in sentencing, parole, police methods, etc. All the states
learn from the mistakes and successes of each state and each new
experiment.
One facet of maintaining public order is the decision of how to fairly dis-
tribute conflicting rights. The grant of a right to one person often involves a
corresponding suppression of another's freedom. The national government
has played an important role in the resolution of such conflicts. One exam-
1987] 1079
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ple is Congress's fight against discrimination. Congress has had to reconcile
the right to equal opportunity on the one hand with the right of private
property on the other. This struggle has resulted in the civil rights laws.
The structure of the legislative process has ensured that all of the competing
interests had access to a full hearing in the resolution of this problem.
C. Putting a Harness on Government
Thomas Paine, the great patriot and pamphleteer, once observed that gov-
ernment is at best a necessary evil. 13 As was discussed in the foregoing
paragraphs, government is necessary to protect the population from threats
from abroad and anarchy at home. But why is it an evil? Because when
government exceeds its mandate to guarantee freedom and acts as an instru-
ment of ever increasing control, it ceases to be a solution and becomes a part
of the problem. Unfortunately, as Montesquieu observed, this is the ten-
dency of all governments. This was the failure of all systems before 1789;
overcoming that tendency in the states and the national government has
been the ultimate challenge to the Constitution.
Before the Civil War the national government had few checks on the
states. Many people, led by John Calhoun of South Carolina, asserted that
the national government derived its powers from the sovereign states, and
that the states had a right to secede. This question was solved by the Civil
War: the states did not have a right to secede and, like the national govern-
ment, derived their powers from the Constitution. This division of powers
shifted further in favor of the national government as a result of the post-
Civil War amendments to the Constitution. 14 Furthermore, the protection
of structural federalism was diluted greatly when the election of senators was
taken out of the hands of state legislatures and given to the people as a
whole. 15 The national government has since been in a much stronger posi-
tion to right state wrongs.
The Voting Rights Act of 196516 is a well-known example of Congress
stepping in to correct such abuses. Many states had been denying many of
their citizens one of the rights most fundamental to a democratic society-
the right to vote. The people being disenfranchised had no recourse in the
state political system to correct this abuse. Congress saw this problem and
acted. Now all segments of the American adult population have the right to
vote and the ability to exercise that right.
The federal courts have also acted to correct state offenses. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the fourteenth amendment's requirement that states
guarantee "due process of law" to mean that most provisions of the Bill of
Rights are applicable to the states. States must therefore respect an individ-
ual's right to a jury trial, the confrontation of witnesses, free speech and
13. T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in I WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 69
(M. Conway ed. 1984).
14. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
15. Id. amend. XVII.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
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religion, free press, and many more freedoms too numerous to mention.
Since they have jurisdiction over all cases involving constitutional ques-
tions, 17 the federal courts have been able to effectively guarantee those
rights.
Presidents have also played a role in correcting state transgressions. A
good example is that of President Dwight Eisenhower. When the State of
Arkansas refused to desegregate its schools in conformity with a federal
court order in 1957, President Eisenhower sent troops into Little Rock to
enforce the order.
But even without these instances of intervention by the national govern-
ment, the pressures of competition ensure that states will not be unrestrained
in dealing with their own citizens. For instance, most of the states had state
churches after the Constitution was originally ratified. There was no consti-
tutional provision barring such establishment at that time. But every state
had disestablished religion by the mid-1800s. Religious freedom had been
guaranteed not by military intervention or court order, but instead because
of competition for commerce and industry. The system used natural human
instincts to expand the horizons of freedom.
Unlike the states, the national government has no outside force to review
its actions other than the electorate. The national government is of course
bound to constitutional restrictions, but these restrictions are interpreted by
one of its own branches, the Supreme Court. This relationship has con-
cerned many states' rights advocates throughout the nation's history. On
the surface, it appears that only self-restraint can keep the national govern-
ment from unchecked growth. But the structural elements of separation of
powers and federalism have provided an effective harness.
An important curb on congressional and presidential abuses of power is
judicial review, the courts' ability to declare acts of the legislative and execu-
tive branches unconstitutional. This power was first asserted by the
Supreme Court in 1803 in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison.18
Many have critized this assertion, arguing that it is a breach of separation of
powers for one branch, the judiciary, to void the acts of its co-equal
branches. However, as Chief Justice John Marshall explained in Marbury,
judicial review is not a breach but instead is a logical and necessary element
of separation of powers. It is the function of the Supreme Court, as it is
with any court, to apply the law by which it is bound to the facts of the case
at hand. Implicit in that function is the duty to determine what the law is
that binds the Court. The law of the land is the Constitution and statutes
passed in pursuance of the Constitution. 19 The Supreme Court must there-
fore determine if a federal statute in question is in compliance with the Con-
stitution before it can perform its judicial role. The Court could not perform
17. The federal courts have possessed broad jurisdiction in this area since the passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)).
18. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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its sworn duty to uphold the Constitution if it were divested of this power.
This is the basis of judicial review. Armed with the power of review, the
federal courts have on many occasions stopped the other two branches from
overstepping constitutional bounds, thereby making certain that the individ-
ual liberties listed in the Bill of Rights are guaranteed for all.
The greatest restriction on the abuse of power by the national government,
however, has been the inefficiencies inherent in the structure itself. The in-
volvement of different constituencies and the diffusion of authority has ar-
rested the trend that has afflicted so many other systems, the trend toward
consolidation of power. The Supreme Court has used its power of judicial
review to maintain this structure.2 0 The result has been a national govern-
ment that has had to prioritize its goals and act upon only those of the most
pressing national concern. This has meant that a great number of citizens'
affairs have proceeded unregulated. The product has been a society of peo-
ple who have been free to pursue their own dreams and destinies and to put
their talents to work for themselves, their families, and society as a whole.
This system has fostered America's rise to the position of the greatest eco-
nomic and military might in the world.
III. CONCLUSION
But America is more than a military power, more than a economic giant.
Indeed, this is more than just a nation. America is an idea, the unrelenting
belief that God made man to be free. Strip away the rest, wonderful though
it is, and the idea still remains, majestic and undeniable. The challenge of
the Constitution has been to make that idea a reality. Through two centu-
ries, as Americans have pushed back the frontiers of their nation, crossing
the Appalachians, the Mississippi, and the Rockies, venturing even into the
depths of outer space, the Constitution has met this challenge and has pre-
vailed. The American system of government, limited by the structural ele-
ments of federalism and separation of powers, not only has protected the
individual liberties won in the Revolution, but has expanded those guaran-
tees with the passage of time. The system certainly has benefitted from its
able defenders: the Washingtons, the Madisons, and the Marshalls of yester-
day and today. But it is the system itself, and particularly its structural
features, that has provided these great men a forum in which to champion
their cause, the cause of freedom. In this bicentennial year of its conception,
let us firmly resolve never to forget that the United States Constitution is the
very lantern that houses the precious flame of that freedom. Armed with
this lantern, it is our challenge and solemn duty to fulfill the American
destiny and shine its brilliant light for all mankind to see.
20. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3188-89, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583, 596-97 (1986)
(reporting provisions of act unconstitutional since Congress must play no role in execution of
laws); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (legislative veto provision of act violated
separation of powers); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (act providing for senate com-
mission enforcement violates appointments clause of constitution).
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